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WHOM TO BLAME?  A LACK OF DEFENDANTS AND PERSONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
AARON L. PAWLITZ* 
A VIEW FROM WITHIN THE FOREST 
Of all the courses students typically take during their first year of law 
school, Torts may be the most easily criticized.1  From a first-year law 
student’s perspective, it may not be an appropriate counterpart to other first-
year courses, such as Contracts, Civil Procedure, Property and Constitutional 
Law, which purport to teach law students to “think like lawyers” and 
appreciate legal foundations.  Instead, the personal injury focus of much of the 
tort material invites the disfavor of some, especially those students who are 
convinced they will never practice that kind of law. 
In addition to lacking the noble feel of other first-year classes, Torts has a 
tendency to mislead students into oversimplification.  A first-year student who 
begins studying the various intentional torts may suspect that mastering the 
material requires only memorizing the various elements of the different causes 
of action.  For instance, I still recall with ease that assault occurs where one 
acts with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact or the imminent 
apprehension thereof and such apprehension results.2 
Initial discussions about negligence also seem relatively straightforward.  
Students may be tempted to believe that once they have located duty, breach, 
causation and damage, the matter is settled.  The “check the appropriate boxes 
for your cause of action” nature of some of the tort material may lead students 
to develop an oversimplified notion of the practice of law.  After finishing my 
first year of law school, I had these and other negative feelings about the value 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Saint Louis University School of Law; B.A. magna cum laude, University of 
Missouri at St. Louis.  I would like to thank: Professor Joel K. Goldstein, Saint Louis University 
School of Law, for introducing me to the joys of Admiralty; my parents, Ron and Gail Pawlitz, 
for contributing to my beliefs about personal responsibility; and my wife, Jennifer Pawlitz, for her 
patient encouragement and support. 
 1. One of the professors at Saint Louis University School of Law, when informed of my 
opportunity to write this essay on a student’s perspective of the value of Torts, responded, “is 
there any?” 
 2. See Castiglione v. Galpin, 325 So. 2d 725, 726 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that assault 
occurs where threats are coupled with the present ability to carry out threats). 
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of the course.  I concluded that Torts must have been placed in the first-year 
curriculum to get it out of the way early.3 
STEPPING OUT OF THE TREES 
My opinion on the value of Torts would eventually improve.  While 
working for a law firm during the summer following my first year, I began to 
see glimpses of just how much the practice of law required knowledge of what 
I had learned in Torts.  I was particularly impacted while researching issues 
relevant to a wrongful death suit arising from a car accident.  The suit included 
negligence, negligence per se and product liability claims.  Although 
researching these claims took me back to the days of memorizing elements and 
hunting for duty, because I was personally involved in that sort of case,4 I was 
forced to consider deeper issues of recovery.  The plaintiffs, parents of the 
decedent, were fairly affluent, so I was intrigued by their need for recovery.5  
This intrigue led me to more intimately consider the goals of the torts system 
than I had previously. 
Ultimately, it was not until the end of my third semester of law school that 
I was convinced Torts had actually contributed something valuable to my legal 
education.  An upper-division course in Admiralty was primarily responsible 
for my change of opinion regarding the value of the class.  I enrolled in 
Admiralty because I thought it was a quirky area of the law, it is practiced 
predominantly in federal court, and it has some practical appeal in St. Louis, 
near the convergence of the Missouri, Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.  In 
addition to satisfying my curiosity about maritime law, the course ultimately 
forced me to think more deeply about tort matters generally.  This should not 
be surprising.  Due to the nature of a substantial portion of the material 
covered, Admiralty could be renamed “Water Torts.”6 
 
 3. Perhaps it is also offered early with the hope that students would have a better 
appreciation of discussions in Contracts about “returning to the womb” of tort. 
 4. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2. 
 5. That is, their financial need.  I am sure that recovery in some sense assisted their need for 
closure in light of this family tragedy. 
 6. Admiralty cases often serve as the Torts student’s introduction to negligence.  See Joel 
K. Goldstein, Reconceptualizing Admiralty: A Pedagogical Approach, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 
625, 631 (1998) (noting that many students are introduced to Judge Learned Hand’s economics of 
negligence test when studying United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 149 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 
1947)).  Other Admiralty cases highlight significant themes and doctrines within torts: Vincent v. 
Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910) (necessity); The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d 
Cir. 1932) (customary practice); East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 
858 (1986) (limits of product liability).  See Goldstein, supra, at 631-32.  Professor Goldstein 
suggests that Admiralty cases are useful for learning about other areas of the law, as well.  See id. 
at 632-34. 
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QUESTIONS OF RECOVERABILITY 
By the end of the first semester, if not the first month, of law school, torts 
students may have resigned themselves to the common belief that anyone can 
be sued for anything.  In situations where the accidents are largely 
unpredictable and unpreventable, however, determining against whom to 
pursue an action requires more advanced calculus.  Students faced with such 
incidents must seriously consider whether any defendant can be liable, the 
extent to which the plaintiff should be forced to bear the burden of her 
circumstances and the student’s position on the role of “chance” or, to put it 
more plainly, “bad luck.” 
The dangers of the high seas present circumstances where damage to 
person or property may be unpredictable or unpreventable.  In some cases, the 
damage may even be unexplainable.  In Stevens v. The White City, the 
plaintiff’s boat, the Drifter, sustained damage while being towed by the 
defendant.7  The damage occurred at a time when the defendant was in 
complete control of the Drifter and no one representing the plaintiff was 
available to observe the manner in which the defendant handled the tow.8  The 
Supreme Court ruled the defendant was not liable for the damage to the 
Drifter.9 
Students considering whether they agree with the Court’s decision in 
Stevens must confront the fact that there were forces at work on the high seas 
that were beyond the defendant’s control.  The Drifter’s damage may have 
been sustained due to contact with a large piece of driftwood or a hungry 
shark.  On the other hand, the defendant may have negligently maneuvered the 
Drifter into port, striking her against numerous objects as she made her way 
past buoys, piers and other boats.10  To what extent should the plaintiff’s 
recovery be diminished by his failure to supervise the tow?  Should the 
defendant be held liable for the damage to the Drifter notwithstanding the 
numerous dangers on the high seas? 
A HEALTHY DOSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Admiralty cases also offer an opportunity to consider matters of personal 
responsibility.  Historically, seamen11 have enjoyed “favored status” in the 
 
 7. Stevens v. The White City, 285 U.S. 195, 199 (1932). 
 8. One of the questions considered by the Court was whether towage contracts created a 
bailment, through which the defendant would have been strictly liable for any damage to the 
Drifter.  Id. at 200-01.  The Court ruled towage contracts did not create a bailment.  Id. 
 9. Id. at 203-04. 
 10. It is likely, however, that there would be witnesses to this sort of damage. 
 11. For clarifications of “seaman” status, see Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 
548 (1997), Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995) and McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 
498 U.S. 337 (1991). 
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courts.12  Injured seamen13 have access to a wide range of remedies, including 
maintenance and cure,14 unseaworthiness actions15 and those available under 
the Jones Act.16  When a seaman is injured, a court must weigh the duty owed 
the seaman by the shipowner against the seaman’s obligation to act in a 
reasonably prudent manner.17  In light of their protected status, considering 
whether a seaman can be held personally responsible for his injuries requires 
special consideration. 
In Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., a seaman was injured when he 
attempted to disembark a fishing vessel on which he was employed.18  The 
seaman slipped as he stepped onto the ship’s rail because it had become 
covered with “slime and fish gurry” from earlier unloading operations.19  At 
trial, the question arose whether the boat owner could be held liable for the 
unseaworthy condition present—the fish slime—if he had no notice thereof.  
The Supreme Court held the owner could be held liable despite lack of 
notice.20 
The fact pattern in Mitchell invites one to consider the extent to which the 
seaman was responsible for his own actions.  Was he not free to make his own 
decision about whether it was wise to step on a rail that was covered with fish 
slime?  The Court’s opinion noted that it was customary for seamen to 
disembark in this manner, but the first-year torts student should be aware that 
even custom is not dispositive of whether action is proper.21  Furthermore, the 
seaman could have undertaken to remove the slime.  Nonetheless, arguments 
exist which support the Court’s opinion.  Some may be quick to fault the 
owner of the ship for not providing a reasonably safe means by which to exit 
the vessel.  Was the owner not responsible for the safety of those he employed?  
 
 12. See, e.g., The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) (outlining historic remedies available for 
seamen, including seaworthiness and maintenance and cure). 
 13. The law goes so far as to protect seamen who are injured while on shore leave and those 
not historically thought of as sailors.  See, e.g., McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 
(1991); Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951). 
 14. Maintenance and cure entitles an injured or ill seaman to a living allowance and 
compensation for medical expenses.  The employer’s obligation ends once the seaman has been 
“cured” to the maximum extent possible.  See, e.g., Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949) 
(holding seaman not entitled to continued maintenance and cure once he reached maximum cure). 
 15. For a discussion of seaworthiness, see Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 
(1960).  See also Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494 (1971) (discussing the 
evolution of seaworthiness). 
 16. See Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994). 
 17. With respect to seaworthiness, for instance, a shipowner must provide a vessel that is 
reasonably suited for its intended purpose.  Satisfaction of this standard does not require 
perfection.  See Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 550. 
 18. See id. at 539-40. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 550. 
 21. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). 
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How compelling was the duty he owed the seaman to provide a seaworthy 
vessel? 
CONCLUSION:  WHAT TORTS CAN TEACH ABOUT RECOVERABILITY AND 
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
After discovering that Admiralty provided me an opportunity to consider 
issues of recoverability and personal responsibility,22 I realized that this same 
opportunity was available in my first-year torts class.  The fact patterns I 
encountered there raised many of the same issues.23  Unfortunately, I had been 
too busy memorizing elements and locating breach to notice the greater issues 
inviting my attention. 
Topics to which I was introduced in Torts have much to do with 
recoverability.  Res ipsa loquitur, the notion that certain incidents do not 
happen in the absence of negligence, is implicit recognition that some things 
do happen without negligence.  Concerns with proximate cause require courts 
to consider whether they will allow a chain of causation to continue ad 
infinitum.24  By acknowledging that a chain of causation must be terminated at 
some point, courts are cautious about not extending liability to those who are 
not truly responsible. 
Likewise, tort topics invite students to consider the role of personal 
responsibility.  The proliferation of comparative fault liability was not only a 
step away from the harshness of contributory negligence for recovery’s sake, 
but also recognition that defendants should only be penalized to the extent they 
are at fault.  Liability without fault, or strict liability, allows damages to be 
recovered even where a defendant has taken great precautions.  Strict liability 
 
 22. Some may argue that these two issues are inextricably bound to each other.  This may 
be.  I have separated them herein, however, to highlight the specific issues to which I was drawn 
in Stevens and Mitchell. 
 23. See, e.g., Lopez v. McDonald’s, 238 Cal. Rptr. 436, 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).  Lopez 
presents an opportunity to consider both recoverability and personal responsibility.  There, after a 
lone gunman killed twenty-one people and injured eleven in a shoot-out at a McDonald’s 
restaurant in San Ysidro, California, a police sharpshooter killed him.  Id. at 438.  Without the 
gunman alive to face the consequences of his actions, some would argue no responsible party 
remained to be named a defendant.  The plaintiffs, however, representing patrons and employees 
of the restaurant, alleged McDonald’s should have known of the dangerous conditions in the 
surrounding neighborhood and provided security.  Id. at 440.  The court characterized the issue as 
whether McDonald’s had a duty to protect patrons and employees against “once-in-a-lifetime 
massacres.”  Id.  With the issue so characterized, it is difficult to arrive at a judgment other than 
that which the court handed down—recovery denied for the plaintiffs.  Id. at 450.  From a 
personal responsibility standpoint, the court might have questioned the plaintiffs regarding why 
they chose to be employed at or to patronize a restaurant located in such an allegedly dangerous 
neighborhood.  See id. at 445. 
 24. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
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is often imposed when the defendant is handling dangerous materials25 or 
engaging in dangerous26 or uncontrollable activities.27  Finally, insurance, 
omnipresent in tort law, provides a safety net for situations where there may be 
no one to hold responsible. 
I now realize that Torts is more than a laundry list of causes of action and a 
collection of darkly humorous cases.28  Torts requires more of students than 
merely understanding the distinction between contributory and comparative 
negligence and the significance of the reasonably prudent person.  Torts offers 
students an opportunity to consider deeper policy-related matters.  The process 
of deliberating the merits of courts’ opinions forces consideration of, to state it 
simply, how far the law should go.  Moving beyond the elements and into the 
policy will assist students as they seek to more clearly understand courts’ 
rationales.  This is the greatest contribution of Torts, especially as a first-year 
course. 
Among the secondary benefits Torts offers is providing law students an 
opportunity to consider what their role will be in shaping policy.  Placing 
students in situations that compel them to consider whether recovery is proper 
allows them to evaluate the goals of the tort system and to grapple with the 
proper role for those providing legal representation.  Likewise, students should 
not depart law school without having considered just how much burden the law 
should place on people with respect to personal responsibility.  It would be 
unfortunate, indeed, if the downward-creeping standards to which society 
holds itself were accepted merely because its members had not considered the 
issue and were willing to simply accept the status quo. 
Although I am convinced that formulating a position on issues such as 
personal responsibility should be undertaken by all, it is especially critical that 
today’s law students do so.  The conclusion we reach after such an exercise 
governs how we will conduct ourselves as a profession, how we will interact 
with our colleagues and what we will expect of our adversaries as twenty-first 
century lawyers. 
 
 
 25. See, e.g., Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972) (finding “[h]auling gasoline 
in great quantities as freight, we think, is an activity that calls for the application of principles of 
strict liability”). 
 26. See, e.g., Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (1849) (holding defendant strictly liable for 
damage from blasting). 
 27. See, e.g., Isaacs v. Powell, 267 So. 2d 864 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (discussing strict 
liability for animals); Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (Ex. 1866) (holding defendant liable for 
building reservoirs which damaged plaintiff). 
 28. One case I recall telling the family about is Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706 
(D. Md. 1948), where surgeons failed to remove a large surgical towel from the patient’s 
abdomen before stitching him up.  More than eight months passed before the linen was removed.  
Id. at 708. 
